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How is the brain engaged when people are thinking about their hopes, dreams, and
obligations? Regulatory focus theory postulates two classes of personal goals and
motivational systems for pursuing them. Ideal goals, such as hopes and aspirations, are
pursued via the promotion system through “making good things happen.” Ought goals,
such as obligations or responsibilities, are pursued via the prevention system through
“keeping bad things from happening.” This study investigated the neural correlates of
ideal and ought goal priming using an event-related fMRI design with rapid masked
stimulus presentations. We exposed participants to their self-identified ideal and ought
goals, yoked-control words and non-words. We also examined correlations between
goal-related activation and measures of regulatory focus, behavioral activation/inhibition,
and negative affect. Ideal priming led to activation in frontal and occipital regions as well
as caudate and thalamus, whereas prevention goal priming was associated with activation
in precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. Individual differences in dysphoric/anxious
affect and regulatory focus, but not differences in BAS/BIS strength, were predictive of
differential activation in response to goal priming. The regions activated in response to
ideal and ought goal priming broadly map onto the cortical midline network that has been
shown to index processing of self-referential stimuli. Individual differences in regulatory
focus and negative affect impact this network and appeared to influence the strength and
accessibility of the promotion and prevention systems. The results support a fundamental
distinction between promotion and prevention and extend our understanding of how
personal goals influence behavior.
Keywords: regulatory focus, promotion, prevention, personal goals, fMRI, behavioral activation system, behavioral
inhibition system
INTRODUCTION
A person’s hopes, dreams, and wishes, whether attained or
unattained, have always been seen as central to an individual’s
identity—as the essence of who a person is because they represent
that which a person strives to be (James, 1890/1948). The kind of
individual we wish to be, and the kind of person we believe we
must be, are powerful influences on behavior and affect whether
we see ourselves as succeeding or failing to attain those wishes
and obligations (Kelly, 1955). Classic (Allport, 1955) as well as
contemporary (Morf andMischel, 2012) personality theorists, for
example, have used the concept of becoming as a rubric for under-
standing individual differences in motivational orientation along
with the affective consequences of failing to be that which we want
to be or must be. Personal goals are real in a profoundly psycho-
logical sense—dreams and obligations are “truth” for individuals
whether or not they “come true.”
The goal construct in psychology captures much of how hopes,
dreams, and wishes guide behavior and experience. Behavioral
scientists have conceptualized personality as reflecting differences
among people in terms of the higher-order goals they pursue and
their characteristic ways of pursuing them (Cantor and Zirkel,
1990). Indeed, goals are a central construct in theories of behavior
because they provide a unified conceptual framework linking
internal states (needs, motives, beliefs) and the social world.
When people believe they have attained an important goal, they
may feel joyful, satisfied, fulfilled, or worthy; when people believe
they have failed to attain a goal, they may feel inadequate, hope-
less, worthless, guilty, or ashamed (Sullivan, 1953; Rogers, 1961).
Yet, to date there has been little research examining how neu-
ral systems are engaged when people think about their personal
goals, both when the goals are attained as well as when they
are not.
In an influential review, Austin and Vancouver (1996) defined
goals as internal representations of desired states and identified
approach and avoidance goals as among the most important
classes of goals. The vast behavioral science and neuroscience
literatures on approach and avoidance attest to the centrality
of these dimensions for understanding goal-directed behavior.
Those literatures are dominated by the behavioral activation
and inhibition systems model, postulating brain/behavior sys-
tems that underlie temperament-based approach and avoidance
as well as dispositional positive and negative affectivity (Watson
et al., 1999). Both the behavioral activation system (BAS) and
behavioral inhibition system (BIS) are hypothesized to regulate
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proximal goal-directed behaviors in response to cues for reward,
in the case of BAS, or threat, in the case of BIS (Carver and
Scheier, 1998). The two systems each represent a locus for the
interaction of cognitive and affective processes, and each is asso-
ciated with neural circuitry identified originally on the basis of
animal research and shown to have analogs in the human brain
(Gray, 1990, 1994).
Many personality and social theorists take a complementary
perspective on the regulation of approach and avoidance, empha-
sizing abstract, higher-order goals that are cross-situational and
integrated within the individual’s sense of self. Higgins (1997)
proposed a theory of regulatory focus that postulated two moti-
vational systems for attainment of desired outcomes. Each is
activated by contextual cues but also manifests trait-like proper-
ties across situations. Individual differences in regulatory focus
are stable over time and predict which goals will be more likely
to be used to guide behavior, as well as the strategies and means
for pursuing them (Strauman, 1996). The behavioral and affec-
tive consequences of individual differences in regulatory focus are
well-established (Higgins, 2012).
RFT draws on prior studies of self-evaluation and discrep-
ancy monitoring and describes two regulatory systems that serve
critical but distinct survival needs. The promotion system, which
develops in response to children’s need for nurturance (Bowlby,
1988), supports the attainment of positive outcomes by strategic
approach, i.e., by “making good things happen.” The promo-
tion system is particularly active in the pursuit of ideals (aspi-
rations, advancement, and accomplishment)—that is, the kind
of person an individual can be or might be. The prevention
system, which develops in response to children’s need for secu-
rity (Bowlby, 1988), also supports the attainment of positive
outcomes, but instead by strategic avoidance, i.e., by “keeping
bad things from happening.” The prevention system is particu-
larly active in pursuit of oughts (fulfillment of responsibilities,
duties, and obligations)—that is, the kind of person an individual
believes she/he must be or is supposed to be.
Individuals vary both in the characteristic ways they construe
their goals and their chosen strategies to pursue them. As a con-
sequence of variation in life experiences, a person might acquire
increased value or personal relevance for one type of goal. For
example, a strong value placed on prevention goals will result
in goal pursuit strategies that involve keeping bad things from
happening—for example, by avoiding pitfalls and negative out-
comes in the service of ultimate goal attainment. In addition,
the same desired end-state can be represented in different ways
by prevention-oriented vs. promotion-oriented individuals. The
same goal—such as being honest—could be represented as an
ideal or aspiration (a promotion goal) or as an obligation or
responsibility (a prevention goal).
In this article, we examine the neural correlates of priming
personal goals using ideals and oughts as exemplars of the two
types of goal representations postulated within RFT. We consider
three largely unexplored questions about how the brain is engaged
in pursuit of ideals and oughts. First, does priming of an indi-
vidual’s ideal vs. ought goals, already shown to result in distinct
cognitive, motivational, and affective responses, also lead to dis-
criminable patterns of neural activation? Second, do activation
patterns associated with ideal vs. ought goals vary as a function
of individual differences relevant to self-regulation? And third,
since self-regulatory cognition is inherently connected with affect
and with vulnerability to disorders such as depression and anxi-
ety, do activation patterns observed following ideal and/or ought
goal priming vary depending on an individual’s current level of
negative affect?
Based on existing findings in social cognitive neuroscience,
there are several different patterns of neural activation that might
characterize responses to priming of promotion and prevention
goals (and, in turn, contribute to the construct validity of reg-
ulatory focus). One set of regions are those structures known
to be activated by reward or threat cues, consistent with the
role of BAS and BIS as mechanisms for individual differences in
sensitivity to such cues (Amodio et al., 2007). There are concep-
tual links between the BAS system and the promotion system,
since promotion goal pursuit requires responsiveness to oppor-
tunities for rewards in the environment and the use of strategic
approach behaviors to achieve desired ends. There are similar
links between the BIS system and the prevention system, because
of the relevance of the strategic avoidance of negative outcomes
in prevention goal pursuit. BAS-related regions implicated in
response to incentives include the ventral striatum and ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex, with the former a locus for the coding of
predictions regarding positive outcomes and the latter important
for the processing of the hedonic significance of stimuli (Bjork
et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2004; Kringelbach, 2005; Clithero
et al., 2011). Individual differences in BIS strength have been
associated with circuits linking the hippocampus, subiculum, and
related structures (sometimes also including the basolateral and
centromedial nuclei of the amygdala) (e.g., Reuter et al., 2004).
Thus, the neural correlates of promotion vs. prevention could
reflect the neuroanatomical distinctions between the substrates of
BAS and BIS.
Another potential set of neural correlates of promo-
tion/prevention goal activation is the group of regions referred
to collectively as cortical midline structures (Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004; Lou et al., 2010; Qin and Northoff, 2011). These
structures, which typically include the orbital and adjacent medial
prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, and the posterior cingulate cortex, are regarded
as an anatomical unit because of strong reciprocal projections
among the individual structures and similar patterns of connec-
tivity with other brain regions. They also are characterized as a
network that subserves the representation and processing of self-
referential stimuli (Beer and Ochsner, 2006). This set of regions
may underlie the activation of promotion and prevention goals
that are functionally linked to aspects of one’s identity, including
higher-order goals representing one’s ideal self or ought self.
A third possibility is that the promotion and prevention goal
representations overlap with the Self-Memory System postulated
by Conway (SMS; Conway and Pleydell-Pierce, 2000). The SMS
is a conceptual framework linking self and memory that consists
of two main components: the working self and the autobio-
graphical memory knowledge base. Drawing in part on studies of
self-discrepancy and autobiographical memory (e.g., Strauman,
1990), Conway (2001) proposed that frontotemporal networks
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mediate the connection between anterior regions associated with
the working self (e.g., one’s currently active goals and beliefs) and
the autobiographical knowledge base, accessed through tempo-
ral lobe regions, needed to effectively pursue such goals within a
dynamic interpersonal context.
Several studies have examined associations between regu-
latory focus and brain activity, with the evidence to date
suggesting a link between promotion/prevention and midline
cortical structures as well as a pattern of prefrontal cortex
asymmetry akin to that observed in the BAS/BIS literature
(Davidson and Irwin, 1999). Amodio et al. (2004) examined
the associations between an implicit assessment of individual
differences in regulatory focus and an EEG index of resting
frontal cortical asymmetry. They observed that chronic pro-
motion focus was associated with greater left frontal activity,
whereas chronic prevention focus was associated with greater
right frontal activity. Cunningham et al. (2005) found that neu-
ral activation when making good/bad judgments differed by
individuals’ regulatory focus: chronic promotion focus was asso-
ciated with greater activation in the amygdala, anterior cin-
gulate, and extrastriate cortex following positive stimuli, and
chronic prevention focus was associated with activity in the
same regions for negative stimuli. Touryan et al. (2007) also
used fMRI to study the impact of individual differences in reg-
ulatory focus on memory for emotional words. They observed
that activity in posterior cingulate cortex, associated with self-
referential processing, was greater for correctly remembered
stimulus words when they were consistent with an individual’s
regulatory focus. Packer and Cunningham (2009) investigated
how regulatory focus interacted with reflection on personal
goals and observed differential activation patterns according to
goal domain (promotion vs. prevention) and temporal distance
(short-term vs. longer-term).
Two studies have used idiographically selected promotion and
prevention goals as stimuli within fMRI designs. Eddington et al.
(2007) used incidental semantic priming via a “depth of pro-
cessing” judgment task to examine patterns of cortical activation
associated with promotion and prevention goals. An area of
left PFC was activated during promotion goal priming across
all four judgment tasks, and the magnitude of activation in
this region was correlated significantly with individual differ-
ences in strength of orientation to promotion goals. In contrast,
activation at this site did not correlate significantly with ori-
entation to prevention goals or with individual differences in
BAS/BIS strength. Eddington et al. (2009) examined the neu-
ral correlates of promotion and prevention goal priming in a
sample of unmedicated adult patients meeting Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual-IV-R criteria for major depressive disorder
(MDD) as well as an age- and gender-matched control sample
of adults with no psychiatric history, using the same judgment
task. They hypothesized that MDD patients would show an atten-
uated left PFC response to promotion priming compared to the
non-depressed controls. There was a significant difference in
activation between the depressed and non-depressed groups fol-
lowing promotion goal priming, with controls showing greater
left medial orbital PFC activation following promotion priming
than the depressed patients. In addition, a region in right PFC
was activated following prevention priming amongMDDpatients
with comorbid anxiety.
The findings to date suggest that promotion and prevention
may be associated with distinct patterns of neural activation, but
none of the prior studies was designed specifically to address that
question. In the present study, we adapted an fMRI paradigm
developed by Diaz andMcCarthy (2007) for rapidmasked presen-
tation of semantic stimuli. Masking provides a method for iden-
tifying cognitive processes that are preattentive, routinized, and
automatic (Dehaene et al., 2001). The use of rapid masked idio-
graphic goal priming offers several significant advantages. First,
promotion and prevention goals can be activated automatically
like other highly accessible social constructs (i.e., without inten-
tional selection of a goal upon which to focus one’s efforts); there-
fore, a paradigm that would allow detection of implicit priming
effects was highly desirable. Second, the two studies by Eddington
and colleagues were restricted in the number of goal priming tri-
als included because individuals typically describe a small number
of motivationally significant personal goals, thereby limiting the
number of goal words available for use as explicit priming stim-
uli. The use of rapid masked stimulus presentation allows for a
greater number of trials within an event-related design (in part
because stimuli can be repeated more frequently). Third, because
the participant’s task in the Diaz and McCarthy paradigm is sim-
ply to make a response whenever she/he sees a non-word stimulus
in color (e.g., ampersands in red font), a task that was non-
self-referential, there is less potential for overlap or interference
between the experimental task and priming-based activation of
idiographically selected promotion and prevention goals.
Using this paradigm, we explored three aspects of the neu-
ral correlates of promotion and prevention goal representations.
First, we examined whether BOLD activation patterns would
differ for idiographic priming of promotion goals vs. preven-
tion goals. Second, we examined whether activation in regions
associated with promotion/prevention goal priming would be
correlated with ratings of perceived success pursuing goals and/or
BAS/BIS strength. Third, we examined whether the activation
patterns observed following promotion and/or prevention goal
priming would be modulated by the individual’s current level of
negative affect, specifically dysphoric and anxious symptoms.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
OVERVIEW
Based on an event-related fMRI paradigm developed by Diaz
and McCarthy (2007), participants were exposed to a contin-
uing series of rapidly presented masked visual stimuli includ-
ing (1) a subset of each participant’s ideal and ought goals
assessed in a prior session, (2) ideal and ought goals of a dif-
ferent participant (as a yoked-control condition), and (3) non-
word letter strings. Participants were told that the task was to
respond as quickly as possible whenever they detected a string
of letters or symbols presented in a colored font. The detec-
tion task was actually a means to keep participants attending to
the continuous stimulus presentation. BOLD signal responses to
ideal and ought goals were contrasted with responses to control
words to test hypotheses about neural correlates of personal goal
activation.
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PARTICIPANTS
Participants were recruited through the introductory psychol-
ogy research pool at Duke University and were part of a larger
sample (N = 75) who had completed a study earlier in the
semester. The initial study session, described as an investigation
of personality, included several self-report measures relevant to
the present research. Approximately two months after the per-
sonality study, potential subjects were contacted by phone and
invited to participate in what was described as an investigation
of visual attention. Thirty-three students (16 male) agreed to par-
ticipate; one withdrew from the study prior to the MRI session
for medical reasons, and a second student’s imaging data were
unusable due to technical problems; thus, data from 31 partic-
ipants were included in analyses. All participants were between
the ages of 18 and 22 and were right-handed as indicated by self-
report. Participants reported normal neurological history and
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. All partici-
pants gave informed consent in accordance with Duke University
Institutional Review Board guidelines and received cash payment
as compensation for their time.
PROCEDURE
Individual difference measures
During the personality study session, participants completed a
measure of chronic regulatory focus, a measure of temperament-
based approach and avoidance tendencies, and two measures
of distress. The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins
et al., 2001) is a 22-item Likert-style instrument designed to
measure individual differences in orientation toward promotion
and prevention goals. The RFQ contains four scales (two each
for promotion and prevention): two history scales measuring the
extent to which the individual’s socialization history was charac-
terized by an emphasis on promotion or prevention goals, and
two success scales measuring the extent to which the individual
believes she/he has been successful in attaining promotion or pre-
vention goals. Because the psychometric properties of the history
scales have yet to be determined, only the success scales were
used in the present study. Sample items include: “I feel like I
have made progress toward being successful in my life” (promo-
tion success); and “Not being careful enough has gotten me into
trouble at times” (prevention success—reverse-scored). Higgins
et al. (2001) reported that the success scales had internal con-
sistency reliability (coefficient alpha) of 0.75 or higher, and a
2-month test-retest reliability (Pearson correlation) of 0.79 or
higher.
The BIS/BAS Scale (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 1994) is
a well-validated instrument containing four scales to measure
individual differences in BAS and BIS sensitivity: BIS subscale
(coefficient alpha = 0.74), BAS reward responsiveness subscale
(coefficient alpha= 0.73), BAS drive subscale (coefficient alpha =
0.76), and BAS fun-seeking subscale (coefficient alpha = 0.66).
We report results for a general BAS principal component score
combining all three BAS subscales.
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) is a
widely used 21-item measure of depressive and dysphoric symp-
toms. Respondents are asked to endorse items varying in severity
from (0) to (3) in a number of life areas. For example, “I do not
feel sad” scored (0); and “I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t
stand it” scored (3). The highest rating for each item was summed
across all 21 items to create a continuous measure of depressive
symptoms.
The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al.,
1970) is a self-report assessment which includes separate mea-
sures of state anxiety and the more general quality of trait anxiety.
Participants completed only the trait version for the current inves-
tigation. The essential qualities evaluated by the 20-item STAI-T
scale are feelings of apprehension, tension, nervousness, and
worry (e.g., “I am jittery”). Items are rated on a 4-point scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so) and summed to cre-
ate a scale score. Given the high correlations for the BDI and STAI
in this sample (r = 0.75), and our anticipation that we would not
find distinct patterns of dysphoric vs. anxious affect in this unse-
lected sample of healthy college students (Nitschke et al., 2001),
the two scales were combined by summing individual scale z-
scores into a single dysphoric/anxious index representing current
level of negative affect.
Promotion and prevention goal generation and selection
During the personality study session, participants also completed
a computerized version of the Selves Questionnaire (SQ; Higgins
et al., 1986). The SQ is a semi-structured measure that was used
to sample participants’ own promotion and prevention goals.
Participants listed traits or attributes for two different self-state
representations: the attributes of the kind of person they ideally
would like to be (ideal self-guides, which function as promotion
goals) and the attributes of the kind of person they believe it is
their obligation or responsibility to be (ought self-guides, which
function as prevention goals). Personal goal stimuli for the prim-
ing task were obtained from each participant’s responses to the
computerized SQ. Following the procedures used by Strauman
(1996), four promotion goals (“ideal self” responses) and four
prevention goals (“ought self” responses) that were semantically
unrelated were identified for each participant from among that
participant’s total set of SQ responses. All of the goals selected
from participants’ SQ responses were positively valenced. Then
the promotion and prevention goals were pooled across sub-
jects, and for each participant a set of eight yoked-control words
was selected from that pool so that each yoked-control word
was semantically unrelated to all of the participant’s promotion
and prevention goals. The yoked-control priming condition was
included to rule out the alternative hypothesis that the semantic
content of an ideal or ought word, rather than its status as a per-
sonal goal, might account for the activation observed following a
priming trial.
Goal priming task
The fMRI task was adapted from Diaz and McCarthy (2007).
Participants viewed a continuous stream of masked words and
non-words while performing a detection task in which they were
asked to make a response to a visible colored non-word stimulus
(e.g., percent signs in red font). The detection task ensured par-
ticipant engagement, while the non-word priming controlled for
perceptual and orthographic processing. The masked word stim-
uli were of three types: a subset of the participant’s promotion
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(ideal) goals, a subset of the participant’s prevention (ought)
goals, and yoked-control words (ideal and ought goals of other
participants which had no self-regulatory significance for the
participant her/himself). Three runs, each 600 s in length, were
conducted. The stimuli for each run consisted of words (ideal
goals, ought goals, or a yoked-control word) and non-word let-
ter strings that were masked and displayed in a fixed width font.
All goal words (ideal, ought, and yoked-control) were positively
valenced trait attributes. The non-words were random conso-
nant strings, each 4–10 characters in length. Each letter string
was padded with pound signs so that letters were centered and
each stimulus was 12 characters in length, in order to ensure that
the same amount of the visual field was occupied on any given
priming trial.
Figure 1 presents an example sequence of priming trials within
the overall experimental design as viewed by each participant.
Participants viewed a constantly changing visual display in which
a stimulus was presented every 1500ms for a duration of 33ms.
The majority of the trials were masked non-words; a masked
word from one of the three remaining stimulus conditions was
presented approximately every 12 s. In each run, 16 ideal prim-
ing trials, 16 ought priming trials, and 16 yoked-control prim-
ing trials were included. All word and non-word letter strings
were preceded and followed by pound sign strings for 155ms,
which served as pattern masks. In turn, the pound sign strings
alternated with percent sign strings such that the subject was
exposed to a continuously changing visual stream. The masked
non-word trials ensured that brain regions responsive to phys-
ical features and orthography would be continuously active.
Any brain region that was responsive to one of the three word
priming conditions therefore reflected a higher level of cogni-
tive processing. Participants were instructed to press a button
when they detected a letter or symbol string presented in a
color font. Those target events occurred infrequently (mean inter-
val = 25 s) and were not in close temporal proximity to word
priming trials. All stimuli were displayed on MRI-compatible
LCD goggles.
Manipulation check
The participants were not informed that words or non-words
would be presented. In order to evaluate subjects’ perceptions
of the masked stimuli, both subjective and objective assessments
were conducted. Prior to imaging, participants were shown indi-
vidual masked trials and were asked to report “anything and
everything that you see.” No participant reported seeing words,
and most simply reported that they saw rapidly flashing strings of
pound signs or percent signs. After the three runswere completed,
subjects again were questioned about what they experienced and
then completed a brief questionnaire in which both words that
had been presented in each of the three word priming condi-
tions and an equal number of words that had not been presented
were listed. Participants were told that during the task they had
been exposed periodically to words and were asked to indicate
whether they believed each word had been presented or not.
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the experimental task, displaying a typical
sequence of priming trials. The sequence for an individual trial
consisted of alternating pound signs and percent signs, in between
which a word or non-word was inserted. Promotion goal, prevention
goal, and yoked-control priming stimuli were inserted throughout the
run. Incidental to those stimuli visible colored symbol stimuli were
displayed to which participants were instructed to respond with a
button press as quickly as possible.
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No participant performed significantly beyond chance levels in
identifying presented vs. not-presented words.
fMRI parameters and data processing
Functional images sensitive to blood oxygenation level-dependent
(BOLD) contrast were acquired using an inverse spiral pulse
sequence (TR, 1.5 s; TE, 35ms; FOV, 24 cm; image matrix, 642;
34 contiguous axial slices; voxel size 3.75× 3.75× 3.8mm) on
the research-dedicated 3.0 Tesla GE Signa EXCITE HD system
at Duke’s Brain Imaging and Analysis Center (BIAC: www.biac.
duke.edu). The 3.0 T has an eight-channel head coil for parallel
imaging at high bandwidth up to 1MHz, in addition to its vol-
ume birdcage head coil. Each of the three runs consisted of the
acquisition of a time series of 242 brain volumes (TR= 1.5 s, run
length = 363 s). Four initial RF excitations were performed (and
discarded) to achieve steady state equilibrium. High-resolution
structural images were acquired using a 3D fast SPGR pulse
sequence (TR, 12.2ms; TE, 5.3ms; FOV, 24 cm; image matrix,
2562; voxel size 0.9375× 0.9375× 1.9mm). A semi-automated
high-order shimming program was used to ensure global field
homogeneity.
Analyses of the BOLD signal were conducted using FEAT
(FMRI Expert Analysis Tool; Smith et al., 2004; Woolrich et al.,
2009), part of FSL (FMRIB’s Software Library, Oxford University;
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). The following pre-statistics processing
steps were applied: motion correction using MCFLIRT, slice-
timing correction, removal of non-brain voxels using BET, spatial
smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 8mm, and high-
pass temporal filtering with a cutoff of 100 s. Registration to high
resolution and standard images was carried out using FLIRT.
Statistical analyses
Analyses were conducted to identify regions reliably activated
by ideal and ought goal priming respectively, and each pro-
ceeded in three stages. First, preprocessed functional data were
analyzed using a general linear model with local autocorre-
lation correction (Woolrich et al., 2001). For each run, we
set up separate regressors for promotion (ideal), prevention
(ought), yoked-control, and non-word primes. A nuisance regres-
sor modeled the target detection component of the task. All
regressors consisted of unit impulses convolved with a canon-
ical hemodynamic response function. The contrast of interests
were comparing ideal vs. control and ought vs. control prim-
ing. We then combined data across runs for each subject using
a fixed-effects model, and combined data across subjects using
a mixed-effects model (Beckmann et al., 2003; Woolrich et al.,
2004). We also used the mixed-effects models to obtain sta-
tistical tests for whether the two individual differences mea-
sures of interest (promotion/prevention success and BAS/BIS
strength) and the dysphoric/anxious symptom index signifi-
cantly modulated activation following goal priming. All z-statistic
(Gaussianised t) images were thresholded using clusters deter-
mined by z > 2.3 and a corrected cluster-significance threshold of
p < 0.05 (Worsley, 2001). As Brodmann labels can be somewhat
misleading (Zilles and Amunts, 2010), we report probabilistic
anatomical labels for local maxima within statistically signif-
icant clusters derived from the Harvard-Oxford Cortical and
Subcortical Structural Atlases along with approximate Brodmann
areas.
RESULTS
BOLD ACTIVATION: PROMOTION > CONTROL PRIMING
We analyzed the fMRI data for promotion goal priming by
contrasting responses to ideal priming with responses to yoked-
control priming. As shown in Table 1; Figure 2, we found two
brain regions that responded significantly more in response to
ideal primes than to yoked-control primes, constituting main
effects for promotion priming. The first cluster included occip-
ital pole and lingual gyrus (both bilateral, approximately BA 18).
The second cluster, predominantly left-sided, included subcallosal
cortex (approximately BA 11/25), caudate, and thalamus.
We then repeated the analysis including covariates represent-
ing individual differences in self-regulation, BAS/BIS, and current
level of dysphoric/anxious symptoms (see below) to determine
whether responses to ideal priming were modulated by any of
these variables. There were no significant findings for BAS or BIS
strength, but we found two areas in which activation for ideal
primes compared to yoked-control primes increased as individ-
uals reported higher levels of success attaining promotion goals
(Table 2; Figure 3). The first cluster included bilateral precuneus
cortex (approximately BA 7) and bilateral posterior and ante-
rior cingulate cortex (approximately BA 23 and 31). The second
cluster included bilateral caudate and thalamus.
BOLD ACTIVATION: PREVENTION > CONTROL PRIMING
We analyzed the fMRI data for prevention goal priming by
contrasting responses to ought priming with responses to yoked-
control priming. As shown inTable 2; Figure 2, we found a cluster
comprised of two subregions constituting main effects of preven-
tion priming that responded significantly more to ought primes
than to yoked-control primes: left and right precuneus cortex
(approximately BA 7) and left and right posterior cingulate gyrus
(approximately BA 31).
We then repeated the analysis including the covariates
described above. Again there were no significant findings for BAS
or BIS strength, but we found a cluster in which response to
ought primes relative to yoked-control primes increased as indi-
viduals reported higher levels of success attaining prevention goals
(Table 2; Figure 4). That cluster, which was entirely right-sided,
included lateral occipital cortex (approximately BA 7), angular
gyrus (approximately BA 40), precuneus cortex (approximately
BA 31), and superior parietal lobule (also approximately BA 7).
We also found a cluster in which response to ought primes relative
to yoked-control primes increased as individuals reported lower
levels of success attaining promotion goals. That cluster, which was
entirely left-sided, included superior frontal gyrus (approximately
BA 8) and middle frontal gyrus (approximately BA 6).
GOAL PRIMING BOLD RESPONSES MODULATION BY NEGATIVE
AFFECT
In order to determine whether responses to ideal priming were
modulated by current distress level, we also included the dyspho-
ric/anxious index within the ideal vs. control contrast analysis
as a covariate. As shown in Table 3, we found a cluster that
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Table 1 | Regions showing significantly greater activation following promotion (ideal) priming trials compared to control priming trials.
Probabilistic anatomical label x y z Z statistic Cluster volume (p)
MAIN EFFECT FOR CONTRAST
Occipital pole (57%), supercalcarine cortex (6%) 4 −94 18 3.89 2451mm3 (p < 0.01)
Lingual gyrus (70%) 2 −80 −6 3.41
Lingual gyrus (50%) −8 −66 −8 3.29
Lingual gyrus (17%) −6 −70 −12 3.10
Lingual gyrus (69%), intracalcarine cortex (16%) 2 −74 2 3.08
Lingual gyrus (5%) 0 −68 −8 3.00
Paracingulate gyrus (10%) −14 44 −4 3.90 1677mm3 (p < 0.05)
Subcallosal cortex (14%) −12 26 −4 3.78
Subcallosal cortex (60%) 0 12 −4 3.70
Thalamus (98%) 4 −18 8 3.68
Subcallosal cortex (54%) −10 26 −10 3.53
Subcallosal cortex (45%) −6 24 −4 3.48
POSITIVELY CORRELATED WITH PROMOTION SUCCESS SCORE
Precuneus cortex (41%), cuneal cortex (9%) −8 −74 36 4.02 2878mm3 (p < 0.01)
Posterior cingulate gyrus (37%) −10 −34 38 3.95
Precuneus cortex (42%), posterior cingulate gyrus (42%) −2 −54 18 3.35
Posterior cingulate gyrus (72%), anterior cingulate gyrus (21%) 0 −18 40 3.16
Precuneus cortex (51%), posterior cingulate gyrus (6%) 6 −56 16 3.14
Superior parietal lobule (8%), angular gyrus (6%) −30 −52 34 3.09
Right caudate (93%) 10 16 6 3.71 2138mm3 (p < 0.01)
Left caudate (45%) −24 −28 12 3.45
Left thalamus (38%) −2 −26 6 3.34
Right thalamus (100%) 6 −16 10 3.27
Left thalamus (88%) −4 −24 2 3.10
Coordinates of local maxima within each cluster of activation are in MNI space. Probabilistic labels reflect the likelihood that a coordinate belongs to a given region;
for clarity, only labels whose likelihood exceeds 5% are shown.
FIGURE 2 | Rapid masked promotion and prevention goal priming
induced distinct patterns of activation. (A) To identify brain regions
associated with activation of a promotion goal, we contrasted ideal goal
priming vs. control priming. There was a significant effect for promotion goal
priming in both subcallosal cortex and lingual gyrus (shown in blue). Likewise,
to identify brain regions associated with activation of a prevention goal, we
contrasted ought goal priming vs. control priming. There was a significant
effect for prevention goal priming in precuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus
(shown in red). (B) The chart displays mean standardized parameter
estimates (PEs) at selected sites for the ideal vs. control contrast as well as
the ought vs. control contrast. Within the subcallosal cortex (x − 10, y26,
z − 10), activation was significant greater in response to ideal priming (vs.
control priming). Within the precuneus (x − 32, y14, z46), activation was
significantly greater in response to ought priming (vs. control priming).
showed a significantly greater response to ideal primes than to
yoked-control primes as individuals reported higher levels of
negative affect. This bilateral cluster included the frontal pole
(approximately BA 8) and paracingulate gyrus (approximately
BA 9 and 10). There were no regions identified in this analy-
sis where activation was negatively correlated with the symptom
index. We also had included the dysphoric/anxious index as a
covariate within the ought vs. control contrast. However, we
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Table 2 | Regions showing significantly greater activation following prevention (ought) priming trials compared to control priming trials.
Probabilistic anatomical label x y z Z statistic Cluster volume (p)
MAIN EFFECT FOR CONTRAST
Precuneus cortex (62%), posterior cingulate gyrus (13%) –6 –54 38 3.77 1815mm3 (p < 0.05)
Precuneus cortex (90%) 4 –58 36 3.65
Precuneus cortex (44%) 8 –60 36 3.64
Posterior cingulate gyrus (24%) 20 –36 26 3.42
Posterior cingulate gyrus (14%) –24 –36 30 3.08
POSITIVELY CORRELATED WITH PREVENTION SUCCESS SCORE
Lateral occipital cortex (68%) 36 –70 54 3.72 1579mm3 (p < 0.05)
Angular gyrus (26%), superior parietal lobule (10%) 36 –54 38 3.59
Lateral occipital cortex (12%) 36 –76 56 3.55
Precuneus cortex (16%) 20 –44 40 3.34
Superior parietal lobule (15%) 26 –48 42 3.27
Precuneus cortex (17%) 16 –56 34 3.19
NEGATIVELY CORRELATED WITH PROMOTION SUCCESS SCORE
Middle frontal gyrus (17%) –32 14 46 3.75 1614mm3 (p < 0.05)
Superior frontal gyrus (43%) –20 36 48 3.45
Superior frontal gyrus (48%) –14 26 62 3.37
Superior frontal gyrus (20%), Middle frontal gyrus (7%) –26 18 64 3.33
Superior frontal gyrus (20%) –16 24 50 3.30
Frontal pole (63%), superior frontal gyrus (8%) –12 44 44 3.29
Coordinates of local maxima within each cluster of activation are in MNI space. Probabilistic labels reflect the likelihood that a coordinate belongs to a given region;
for clarity, only labels whose likelihood exceeds 5% are shown.
found no regions where there was significantly greater activation
in response to ought vs. yoked-control priming as a function of
negative affect.
DISCUSSION
Despite their centrality for behavior,motivation, mood, and iden-
tity, only recently have personal goals such as hopes, dreams, and
obligations been examined from a cognitive neuroscience per-
spective. Personal goals are similar to more concrete, situation-
specific goals in that they frequently entail either approach or
avoidance, but they are distinct with regard to their abstractness,
their motivational significance, and their centrality to the self. In
this study, we explored the neural correlates of two classes of per-
sonal goals: promotion goals, which represent desired outcomes
that an individual would attain by “making good things happen,”
and prevention goals, which also represent desired outcomes but
which are attained by “keeping bad things from happening.”
Using rapid masked priming with idiographically selected ideal
and ought goals (both of which are desired personal attributes),
we observed distinct neural activation patterns for the two goal
types. In addition, we found that activation following goal prim-
ing is modulated by individual differences in perceived success
of promotion and prevention goal attainment (but not BAS/BIS
strength) as well as by current level of negative affect. Promotion
and prevention goals have distinct neural correlates, in keeping
with the behavioral distinctions between the two hypothesized
motivational systems.
The activation patterns from the ideal > control and ought >
control contrasts were reliably distinguishable and were most
closely associated with the cortical midline structures model of
the self (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). Nonetheless, it may be
more accurate to say that priming of ideal and ought goals acti-
vated regions known to be associated with a key psychological
process that RFT would predict is relevant: namely, the repre-
sentation of desired outcomes for the self. We did not observe
activation of regions most frequently associated with responses to
spatiotemporal cues for either reward (e.g., ventral striatum) or
threat (e.g., amygdala). Thus, the data are more consistent with
a model organized primarily around personal goals as aspects of
identity than a model of approach/avoidance or positive/negative
affectivity. Of course, this could reflect the paradigm itself, partic-
ularly since our intent was to examine goal priming per se rather
than a more extended cycle of ongoing self-evaluation triggered
by the presence of a discrete cue for reward or threat.
We observed that promotion goal priming led to activation
in frontal and occipital regions as well as caudate and thalamus,
whereas prevention goal priming was associated with activation
in precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. Furthermore, indi-
vidual differences in self-perceived success vs. failure to attain
promotion and prevention goals were correlated with activa-
tion in specific regions that were differentially responsive to
promotion vs. prevention goal priming. For those individuals
with higher scores on the promotion success scale, the ideal >
control contrast was associated with activation in additional
regions including bilateral precuneus and both anterior and pos-
terior cingulate cortex (proximal to, but not identical to, the loci
observed for the main effect of the ought> control contrast). For
participants scoring higher on the prevention success scale, ought
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FIGURE 3 | BOLD responses to promotion goal priming were
modulated by individual differences in self-reported success
pursuing promotion goals and by scores on the symptom index.
(A) For the ideal > control contrast, symptom index scores were
positively correlated with activation in frontal pole and paracingulate
gyrus. (B) The scatterplot displays mean standardized PEs at the right
frontal pole (x8, y40, z52) as a function of symptom index scores.
(C) For the ideal > control contrast, promotion success scores were
positively correlated with activation in precuneus, posterior cingulate,
and other regions. (D) The scatterplot displays mean standardized PEs
at the left precuneus (x − 8, y − 74, z36) as a function of promotion
success scores.
goal priming was associated with activation in right occipital and
parietal regions. Additionally, a correlation was observed between
lower scores on the promotion success scale and left prefrontal
activation following priming with ought goals.
The differences in activation observed for the two classes
of personal goals were striking given that both sets of stimuli
were self-generated by participants, both were self-descriptive,
both were positively valenced, and both represented the kind
of person the individual wanted to become. The only differ-
ence between the two stimulus sets was the kind of personal
goal they represented—in one case (ideal), the individual’s hopes,
aspirations, and desired accomplishments, and in the other
(ought), the individual’s sense of duties, obligations, and respon-
sibilities. In fact the same personal goal—for instance, to be
successful—could be a promotion goal for one person and a
prevention goal for another. RFT would predict that in such
an instance, although the goal itself is identical, the motiva-
tional impetus, cognitive strategies, behavioral means, and affec-
tive responses to goal pursuit would differ radically. For the
former individual, being successful would be attained by a strate-
gic emphasis on accomplishment or being the best one could
be, whereas for the latter, being successful would be attained
by meeting one’s responsibilities and obligations. Our findings
provide evidence that the distinction between promotion and
prevention goals is evident in terms of neural correlates from the
moment such a goal is activated by a contextual cue.
The activation patterns associated with each type of personal
goal involved regions within the cortical midline structures asso-
ciated with self-referential processing as well as regions linked to
other aspects of self-regulation (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Beer
et al., 2009; Heatherton, 2011). For example, promotion goal
priming-activated areas within orbital and medial PFC, both
of which have been reliably demonstrated to be linked to a
range of self-referential mental processes, including represen-
tation and monitoring of self-referential knowledge (Northoff
and Bermpohl, 2004). Promotion priming also was associated
with activation in the caudate and thalamus, which have been
identified as components of both intuition and implicit learn-
ing as well as broader networks underlying reward sensitivity,
preparatory motor functions, social judgment, and goal pur-
suit behavior (e.g., Lieberman, 2000; Rameson et al., 2010). The
greater caudate activation associated with ideal priming among
high-success individuals also may reflect the role of the cau-
date in reward learning and appetitive goal pursuit. Thus, ideals
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FIGURE 4 | BOLD responses to prevention goal priming were
modulated by individual differences in self-reported success
pursuing both types of personal goals. (A) For the ought > control
contrast, promotion success scores were negatively correlated with
activation in middle (MFG) and superior frontal gyrus. (B) The
scatterplot displays mean standardized PEs at the left middle frontal
gyrus (x − 32, y14, z46) as a function of promotion success scores.
(C) For the ought > control contrast, prevention success scores were
positively correlated with activation in lateral occipital cortex (LOC) and
other regions. (D) The scatterplot displays mean standardized PEs at
the right LOC (x36, y − 70, z54) as a function of prevention success
scores.
Table 3 | Regions showing significantly activation positively correlated with symptom index scores following promotion (ideal) priming trials
compared to control priming trials.
Probabilistic anatomical label x y z Z statistic Cluster volume (p)
Frontal pole (36%), superior frontal gyrus (32%) 8 40 52 4.59 2295mm3 (p < 0.01)
Paracingulate gyrus (57%), frontal pole (24%) 8 54 4 3.95
Paracingulate gyrus (40%), anterior cingulate gyrus (13%) –12 44 16 3.84
Frontal pole (24%) –12 56 42 3.74
Frontal pole (21%) 26 56 36 3.71
Frontal pole (14%) –20 58 36 3.31
Coordinates of local maxima within each cluster of activation are in MNI space. Probabilistic labels reflect the likelihood that a coordinate belongs to a given region;
for clarity, only labels whose likelihood exceeds 5% are shown.
may engage regions that subserve representation and pursuit of
abstract positive outcomes via direct, task-focused activity. In
contrast, prevention goal priming was associated with activation
in precuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus, which are impli-
cated in the default mode network (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008)
but also in phenomena such as self-reflection, self-awareness, and
social adaptation (Pearson et al., 2011). As such, oughts may
engage regions that support third-person perspective and moral
reasoning.
Do the observed findings correspond to our knowledge of how
individuals represent and pursue their goals? Given the likeli-
hood that human psychological capabilities evolved in response
to an increasingly complex social environment (Leary, 2004),
activities such as the pursuit of personal goals would of neces-
sity incorporate cognitive processes involving representations
of self and significant others (Derryberry and Reed, 1996). In
order for humans to survive and thrive, they must be not only
capable of effective responses to survival-relevant stimuli. They
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also must be capable of representing and pursuing higher-order,
cross-situational, socially embedded goals, and the representa-
tional, monitoring, and evaluative functions required must be
integrated into coherent brain/behavior systems (Mischel, 2004).
For the higher-order personal goals that people pursue, there is no
necessarily spatiotemporal “moving toward or away from”; rather,
the strategies people use involve “bringing about” or “making
happen” (Carver and Scheier, 1998). This phenomenological dis-
tinction raises the possibility that brain/behavior systems for
strategic approach and avoidance, such as are postulated in RFT,
would be functionally discriminable from those for spatiotempo-
ral approach and avoidance. For example, personal goals such as
being successful, or intelligent, or trustworthy require a top-down
coordination that brings relevant concrete goal representations
into working memory across a range of situations (Carver and
Scheier, 1990). The present data could be interpreted as reflect-
ing how such top-down coordination is manifested differentially
within the brain when promotion or prevention self-regulation is
engaged.
Our findings were somewhat different from those reported by
Eddington et al. (2007, 2009), especially in the case of promo-
tion priming, where left orbital prefrontal activation was found to
be discriminantly associated with promotion goal cues which had
been presented in the context of a self-reference judgment task.
We see the distinctions between the two sets of findings as pri-
marily reflecting differences in the experimental paradigm used.
Eddington et al. (2007, 2009) used a task that had been designed
to identify neural signatures of explicit self-referential processing;
they simply included a set of idiographically selected ideal and
ought attributes within the stimuli used for the judgment task.
Their findings, in essence, revealed a promotion-goal-specific
activation pattern which was embedded within an instructional
set emphasizing self-descriptiveness and requiring a specific judg-
ment. In contrast, the rapid masked priming paradigm in the
present study was selected so that goal-related activation pat-
terns could be observed without the potentially complicating
factor of an explicit self-evaluation in reference to the goal being
primed. The distinction between the activation patterns found by
Eddington and colleagues and those observed in the present study
warrants additional study.
Based on these findings, does RFT help to refine our knowl-
edge of the brain regions involved in the representation of
personal goals? We suggest that in terms of the postulated distinc-
tions between promotion and prevention, the answer is a qualified
yes. The psychological dynamics of the promotion system can
be viewed in signal detection terms (Tanner and Swets, 1954;
Trope and Liberman, 1996), particularly as involving eagerness,
which increases with greater proximity (in this case, conceptu-
ally or symbolically rather than spatiotemporally) to the target
(Higgins, 1998). As such, we postulate that self-reflection may
be less central to promotion-based goal pursuit, since promo-
tion goals “loom larger” as the individual gets closer to attaining
them (Higgins, 1998), and indeed we did not observemain effects
of promotion-triggered activation in posterior midline structures
associated with self-reflective thought.
Prevention system dynamics also can be viewed in signal
detection terms, with the system organized to avoid errors of
commission (albeit still in the service of ultimately attaining a
positive end-state). As such, the prevention system relies upon
vigilance as the dominant motivational state and self-evaluation
as a recursive cognitive process. Consistent with this characteri-
zation, prevention goal priming was associated with activation in
areas engaged by tasks that require self-reflection and even self-
awareness, as well as by decisions involving judgments of morality
and principle (e.g., Greene and Haidt, 2002). Such processes are
of primary relevance to the pursuit of personal goals that are con-
strued in terms of obligation, responsibility, or a sense of “should”
(Higgins, 1997).
Of course, the findings do not represent a self-contained set
of brain/behavior systems associated with personal goal pursuit.
Self-regulation is too complex and multifaceted to be modeled
adequately by a single experimental task. It would have been
unlikely to find activation in areas associated with psychological
processes that are substantially “downstream” from goal activa-
tion, such as consummatory behavior, goal disengagement, or
affect regulation. Nonetheless, the activation patterns immedi-
ately following promotion and prevention goal priming were
discriminable, and the rapid masked priming technique provided
sufficient sensitivity to detect those patterns—which appeared
to be broadly consistent with RFT’s conceptualizations for each
system.
We also observed that individual differences in self-reported
success pursuing a particular kind of goal predicted activation
following priming with idiographic exemplars of such goals,
whereas individual differences in temperament-based approach
and avoidance tendencies (operationalized using the Carver and
White BIS/BAS Scales) did not. The behavioral activation and
inhibition systems are hypothesized to represent inborn, presum-
ably genetically determined variation in sensitivity to cues for
spatiotemporal approach/avoidance behavior and/or the intensity
and duration of behavioral responses to such cues. In contrast,
individual differences in the strength of the promotion and pre-
vention systems have been linked to socialization (Manian et al.,
2006), and in particular to variability in the messages parents
convey to their children about the relative importance of mak-
ing good things happen vs. keeping bad things from happening.
Strauman and Wilson (2010) postulated that the two sets of sys-
tems have different phylogenetic and developmental origins as
well as distinguishable functions. Whereas BAS and BIS appear
to operate in response to immediate, concrete cues for reward
and danger respectively, promotion and prevention operate as
“world views” or cognitive styles and provide a functional link
between pursuit of higher-order personal goals and the social
world. Eddington et al. (2007) reported that the Carver andWhite
scales did not predict neural responses to promotion or preven-
tion goal priming, and the present data are in concordance with
their findings. Together, the two studies provide evidence that the
neurobiological bases of BAS/BIS and promotion/prevention are
likely to be distinct—and offer the possibility that the two sets
of systems interact in complex ways to influence goal-directed
behavior in any specific situation.
Both RFT and its precursor, self-discrepancy theory (Higgins,
1987), predict that perceived lack of progress toward a moti-
vationally significant personal goal would be associated with
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negative affect. Both theories also postulate that chronic distress,
as well as emotional disorders such as depression and anxiety,
can interfere with effective goal pursuit (Strauman, 2002). To
explore the impact of negative affect on personal goal activa-
tion, we examined whether individual variability in negative affect
(assessed by creating a dysphoric/anxious index from the BDI and
STAI)would predict neural responses to promotion or prevention
goal priming. For individuals reporting greater levels of distress,
promotion priming was associated with additional activation in
the bilateral frontal pole and paracingulate gyrus. Prevention
goal priming did not reveal any regions where activation was
modulated by self-reported distress.
What might this pattern of results signify about the influence
of chronic distress on self-regulation? Level of negative affect was
associated with greater recruitment of bilateral frontal regions
in response to cues for “making good things happen,” suggest-
ing that higher levels of distress could introduce a greater degree
of recruitment of prefrontal regions in the goal pursuit process.
More speculatively, such increased frontal activity could signify
activation of negative cognitive schemas, as hypothesized in cog-
nitive models of depression (e.g., Beck et al., 1979), which would
be likely to interfere with effective strategic pursuit of promotion
goals. The nature of the promotion system dictates that the indi-
vidual’s optimal strategy is to ignore errors or unsuccessful trials
and continue with goal pursuit efforts. Too much engagement of
self-evaluation would complicate goal pursuit efforts by divert-
ing processing resources away from the eager motivational state
that characterizes successful promotion goal pursuit. The study
was not intended to explore clinically relevant emotional states
and symptom patterns, and it may be premature to extrapolate
these findings to depression and related internalizing disorders.
Still, the modulation of neural response to ideal priming by neg-
ative affect was robust enough to emerge from an analysis that
included other statistically significant covariates.
In summary, the rapid masked stimulus presentation tech-
nique that we used to prime participants’ promotion and pre-
vention goals led to interpretable and reliably distinguishable
patterns of neural activation. The findings are broadly consistent
with established findings from the social neuroscience literature,
and the discriminability of the activation patterns associated with
the two types of personal goals provides support for the crit-
ical distinction in RFT between promotion and prevention as
modes of self-regulation. To the extent that those modes become
automatic and systematized over time, then perhaps it will be of
value to speak of promotion and prevention “systems” assuming
that present data are replicated using other goal-relevant tasks.
Furthermore, to the extent that individual differences relevant
to self-regulation of personal goal pursuit might be expected to
influence the strength and accessibility of the two systems, our
findings also were consistent with the view that the neural corre-
lates of the systems may differ as a function of individuals’ beliefs
about their success vs. failure in attaining such goals.
We close with several comments about the limitations of
the present research and its potential implications for future
studies. As noted previously, the priming paradigm may be a
reasonable operationalization of one phase of a self-regulatory
cycle—automatic activation of goal pursuit via exposure to a
goal-relevant cue—but it would not be likely to identify neu-
ral responses to other phases of that cycle, such as regulation of
affect in response to goal pursuit feedback or other conscious
processes. Likewise, we did not systematically choose the partici-
pants on the basis of potentially relevant individual differences,
and the priming task did not explicitly target such individual
variability. Our analyses of those individual differences (in reg-
ulatory focus, in BAS/BIS strength, and in chronic distress) are
correlational and represent first steps in an ongoing process of
investigation. It should be emphasized that the promotion and
prevention systems are constructs, in the same way as more famil-
iar brain/behavior systems. We are using those constructs to guide
prediction and interpretation but not making claims about neu-
ral structure or neuroanatomical connectivity. Nonetheless, we
offer these findings as, to our knowledge, the first neuroimaging
evidence for the construct validity of the promotion and preven-
tion systems and the critical roles that individual differences and
chronic affective states play in the day-to-day function of those
systems.
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